Predicting exchange rates via a futures market by Capiński, Marek & Patena, Wiktor
   Predicting exchange rates via a futures market. 
 
 
 
 Marek Capiński and Wiktor Patena 
capinski@wsb-nlu.edu.pl    patena@wsb-nlu.edu.pl  
Finance Department (http://kf.wsb-nlu.edu.pl) 
Nowy Sacz School of Business – National-Louis University 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Predicting future spot exchange rates has always been useful for companies trading 
internationally. Now finding future exchange rates is essential for countries that are to 
join common currency zones (Eurosystem) and need to set reference rates for the ERM 
II. This paper presents a model that attempts to determine exchange rates and, unlike 
others, is based on an analysis of the futures market. The model is based on the 
assumption that the futures market is dominated by two categories of traders: 
arbitrageurs and fundamental traders. The divergence of the futures rate from its 
theoretical value is gauged and then considered to be an indication of the direction and 
strength of the two forces in the market. The arbitrageurs’ influence is filtered out and 
thus the model outputs the rate based on the fundamental traders’ expectations. 
  
Keywords: exchange rate determination, ERM II, futures market  
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1 Introduction  
 
Since the 1970’s, (the end of Bretton Woods era) predicting exchange rates has become 
one of the most difficult tasks in finance. The problem can be attributed to a number of 
factors. Consequently, there are numerous theories which struggle to solve the exchange 
rates determination puzzle, as some (Lyons 2001) call the disconnection between 
fundamental signals and exchange rates.   
 
The issue is especially acute for the CEEC-10 countries that are to join Eurosystem and 
incept euro. Before that they need to meet the convergence criteria, set a reference rate 
against euro and enter the ERM II (European Exchange Rate Mechanism II) – a fixed 
peg exchange rate regime. For the period of two years the rate may fluctuate only 
within %25.2  band (an asymmetric band is also being considered). Otherwise, the 
country will leave the ERM II and go through the procedure again. 
 
How to find the appropriate equilibrium rate that would make the transition into the 
common currency zone smooth is of interest to economists in both policy-making and 
academic circles in Poland and other CEEC countries. According to the ECB (ECB 
2002) “it is important to set a central parity that corresponds to the best possible 
assessment of current economic fundamentals, knowing that this will not prejudge the 
ultimate conversion rate”. On the other hand, rejecting market spot rates and market-
based forecasts just on the ground that they do not converge with some fundamentals 
seems too arbitrary a solution. Thus, anticipating future spot rates (attempted in this 
paper), although tantamount to solving only a part of the problem, appears to be a good 
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starting point for setting the central exchange rate. In fact we will never know where the 
equilibrium rate is until it is market tested. 
 
The authors of this paper have attempted to determine the future exchange rate using a 
new approach. Namely, the research was conducted in the futures market. The main 
assumption of this paper is that there are two informed and influential groups of traders 
in the market: arbitrageurs (group A) whose behavior is somewhat automatic in that it is 
driven by interest rate parity, and fundamental traders (group F) – all the traders who 
refer to a wider range of information than just interest rate differential, including 
commercial traders who use the futures market for hedging. What follows is that the 
market futures rate is located between two values: the futures theoretical value (set by A 
group) and the expectations-based value (expected by fundamental traders). Whenever 
the market futures value diverges by too much from the theoretical one, arbitrageurs 
step in and drive it back close to the appropriate level. Then, the degree and direction of 
the activity of both kinds of traders is measured, and both are factored into an exchange 
rate determination model.  
 
Gradually, the assumption concerning only two groups of traders is relaxed. 
Uninformed traders (e.g. the model by Glosten and Milgrom that shows the relationship 
between bid-ask spread and the activity of the uninformed traders could be used) are 
also incorporated into the model.  
 
The model was tested using historical data from two different sources: the futures 
market on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  The 
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main use of this model is to provide insight into how expectations concerning future 
spot rates are created.  But, in anticipation of the empirical results, we also find that the 
model is a good predictor of future spot rates. 
  
In our view the central parity rate should be based on the market-based forecast (such as 
the one provided in this paper). Implementing a pure fundamental equilibrium exchange 
rate (the rate that fosters the sustainable growth of the main economic factors), 
respectable as it sounds, is risky and hardly realistic, since its values are nowhere near 
the market rates. The central parity should be (in the spirit of behavioural theories) 
consistent with the rate representing a dynamic market equilibrium. 
 
2 Related Research 
 
How to determine the appropriate level of the fundamental rate has been a subject of 
many research papers – most of them unsuccessful. In 1982, Meese and Rogoff (Meese 
1983) published a key paper showing that random walk predicts exchange rates 
movements better than macroeconomic models. The paper highlighted the poor 
performance of all models that had prevailed before 1982, including Dornbusch’s 
overshooting model and the monetary models of Frankel and Mussa. Most of the 
monetary models had three components: money market equilibrium, interest rate parity 
and purchasing power parity. Later, in 2002 Cheung, Chinn and Pascual considered a 
wider range of models (including the portfolio models of Kouri and Branson (Branson 
1985)) and proved again that none of them consistently outperformed the random walk 
in predictive power. Since then, it has become evident that fundamentals, except in the 
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long run, play very little role in explaining exchange rates movements (Food and Rose 
1999, De Grauwe 2000).  
 
Only recently have some new theories appeared. Researchers from the microstructure 
approach (Bacchetta 2003, Evans and Lyons 2001, Brunnermeier 2001, Lyons 2002) 
presented evidence that investor heterogeneity may be a critical driving force behind 
exchange rate fluctuations.  
 Another direction the general theory goes is the rejection of investors’ rationality 
(Goodhart 1989, Gotthelf 2002). It is acknowledged that currency trading is dominated 
by technical analysis and liquidity traders. Hence, models based on the theory of chaos 
may be helpful in explaining some of the changes in exchange rates (De Grauwe 1993).  
 
This paper’s main idea is inspired by the microstructure approach. The authors believe 
that it is possible to identify pertinent groups of investors active in the futures market, 
gauge their contribution towards determining exchange rates, filter out the influence of 
irrelevant traders, and build a model that would generate an accurate informed traders’ 
expectation-based prediction. The problem is that information about the market’s 
microstructure, e.g. number of commercial and non-commercial traders, is often 
unavailable.  
 
There is little literature that studies the futures market in order to find the fundamental 
exchange rate. So far, most of the researchers have tested whether forward rates are 
unbiased predictors of future spot rates and have drawn conclusions about currency 
market efficiency (Frankel 1981, Froot 1990). The studies have yielded conflicting 
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results, but most of them reject the efficient market hypothesis. Therefore, it is worth 
the effort to use resources to attempt to forecast exchange rates. Another approach can 
be found in Clarida and Taylor (Clarida 2001) who tried to prove the relevance of the 
forward rate term structure.  
 
3 Fundamental Forward Rate Model 
              
The review of the literature on the subject shows that fundamentals play little role in 
explaining exchange rate movements, except in the long run. The unpredictability of the 
changes in exchange rates in the short and medium run cannot be simply attributed to 
investors’ irrationality. Rather, we should model the investors’ behavior differently than 
it was done in classical monetary models. The futures market is ideal for observing 
various investors’ expectations with regard to future exchange rates. Hence, the model 
that was built is based on an analysis of this market. The word “fundamental” in its 
name refers more to the kind of traders whose behaviour is analyzed than to 
macroeconomic factors. 
 
First, it is essential to see how the prices are formed. Theoretical futures exchange rate 
is calculated as follows: (Hull 1998): 
))((
),(
tTrr
t
fheStTF

 . When the market futures 
rate diverges from the theoretical value, it would instantaneously lead to arbitrage-
motivated trading and drive the futures rate to the value implied by interest rate parity. 
When doing realistic calculations, additional factors such as bid-ask spread, liquidity, 
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and political risk should be taken into consideration – however, this does not change the 
essence of the reasoning above.  
 
Currency futures contracts are basically a hedging instrument, but they are not 
necessarily helpful in forecasting changes in future exchange rates (the underlying of 
the futures contract). The hypothesis that futures rates are the best unbiased predictors 
of future spot rates has not been confirmed (Frankel 1981, Froot 1990). The small 
forecasting power has little to do with the risk of investing in different currencies either. 
This is why some researchers (Clarida 2001) do not refer to the gap between forward 
premium and a difference between spot rates as a risk premium. Clarida and Taylor 
(Clarida 2001) remain “agnostics” when asked about the reasons for the divergence. 
 
3.1 Structure of the Futures Traders 
 
It is obvious that traders’ behavior determines prices (Flood 1991). However, market 
participants appear to be using different models when predicting future rates. It was 
assumed that the futures market attracts two categories of price-relevant traders.  
 
1. Arbitrageurs who try to profit from differences in spot and futures prices 
 (without taking risk). Activity of the A group can be characterized by 
 automatism, based strictly on interest rate parity. They simply start trading 
 when the gap between the price of a futures contract and its theoretical value is 
 large enough to make the arbitrage profitable.  
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2. Traders who follow fundamental information. The F group includes all the other 
informed traders, including hedgers and speculators, but excluding those 
included in the A group.  
 
In the situation when the futures value diverges from its theoretical value, it reflects on 
the one hand the expectations of the market participants with regard to future spot rates, 
while on the other hand the arbitrageurs’ activity, which takes advantage of the 
divergence between current futures value and the value implied by interest rate parity. 
The F traders place orders that mirror fundamental premises; for instance they take 
positions meant to hedge currency risk exposure of their business activity. The A traders 
place orders motivated by interest rate parity-implied equilibrium rates. The purpose of 
the model developed in this paper is to find the fundamental exchange rate. In order to 
do so, it is necessary to trace the behavior of the F traders and sift out the irrelevant 
signals given by the A traders. 
 
Let us follow an example of an order flow in the futures market. Initially, the futures 
rate equals its theoretical value. Suppose F traders are in the possession of information 
that the value of futures is too high compared to the future spot rate – as they perceive it 
(suppose PLN/EUR is the underlying). Consequently, they take short positions and the 
value of the futures falls. The gap between the futures and its theoretical value grows. 
At some stage of the process arbitrageurs intervene and take arbitrage motivated long 
positions in the futures. Simultaneously, they borrow EUR, convert it into PLN and 
deposit. As a result, spot PLN/EUR exchange rate falls. So does the futures value, as it 
  
 
  
 9 
is contingent on the PLN/EUR spot rate. The gap between the futures and its theoretical 
value closes. 
 
In some markets, unsolicited reports that incorporate information about their 
microstructure (Lyons 2002, O’Hara 1995) have appeared for some time, providing 
researchers as well as traders themselves with valuable data. Commitment of Traders 
Reports (Rockefeller 2002), published weekly since 1962 by Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftccotreports.htm), are an example. The 
traders are classified either as “commercials” or “non-commercials”. All of a trader's 
reported futures positions in a commodity are classified as commercial if the trader uses 
futures contracts in that particular commodity for hedging. A trading entity generally 
gets classified as a "commercial" by filing a statement with the Commission that it is 
commercially engaged in business activities hedged by the use of the futures or options 
markets. Traders of both categories represent from 70 to 90% of the market. The others 
are called “nonreportable positions” and these are the traders who are only occasionally 
involved in trading.  
 
Unfortunately, so far such reports have been published by commodity exchanges only 
(Chicago Board of Trade, MidAmerica Commodity Exchange, Kansas City Board of 
Trade, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and New York 
Board of Trade). They are weekly reports that provide aggregate information. Still, it is 
an important tool that may be useful for predicting price changes. It also partly justifies 
the relevance of the division of traders used for this paper. 
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3.2 Fundamental Forward Rate Model 
 
It may be useful at this point to summarize what has been learned. The main assumption 
of this paper is that the market forward rate is located between two values: the 
theoretical value (represented by the A traders) and the fundamental value (represented 
by the F traders). The main problem is how to measure the degree and direction of the 
activity of both kinds of traders. We hypothesized that how the forward rate diverges 
from its theoretical value may be an indication of the degree and direction (see the 
arrows below) of the activity of both kinds of traders.  
There are two possible situations. 
 (1) ),(),(),( TtFTtFTtF teorfund   
 
(2) ),(),(),( TtFTtFTtF teorfund   
 
The situation expressed by (1) means F traders expect that ),( TtFS teorT  . 
Simultaneously, the opposite force (2) suggests that ),( TtFS teorT  . In other words, the 
value of the forward rate that is lower than the theoretical one implies that the future 
spot rate will also be lower, and vice versa.  
The formula (3) below is a natural consequence of this reasoning. 
 (3) pTtFTtFaTtFTtF
teorteorfund  )),(),((),(),(  
where: a, p – (temporarily unknown) correctional values. 
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We hypothesized that the model (3) enabled us to determine the direction in which the 
future spot rates would change. The relationships (4) and (5) must be verified in order to 
prove that. 
(4) ),(),(),( TtFSTtFTtF teorT
teor   
(5) ),(),(),( TtFSTtFTtF teorT
teor  . 
 
If (4) and (5) were confirmed empirically, the model of exchange rate determination 
based on the relationship could be proposed. 
 
The model was tested using historical data from two different sources. The first sample 
that was chosen included all PLN/EUR futures rates with one-month maturities traded 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange between the years 1999 – 2003. The theoretical rates 
were calculated with WIBOR and EURO LIBOR 1M values. It appears that (4) and (5) 
have been proven accurate in 70% of the cases (see Table 1). In addition to this, 
correlation between ),(),( TtFTtF teor  and ),( TtFS teorT   was found to be significant 
(30%). This may indicate that not only the direction but also the extent to which the two 
forces affect the futures rate could be extracted from the data. 
 
The Polish futures market is not extremely liquid. Hence, there was a need to test the 
hypothesis elsewhere. Another round of research was conducted with Euro FX futures 
contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. This is where the first currency 
futures contracts were introduced in 1972. Similarly, (4) and (5) hypothesis were tested, 
the main question being whether the futures rate and the future spot rate diverge from 
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the theoretical futures value in the same direction. This time positive results, meaning 
that (4) or (5) do work, stipulate 64% of the cases. 
 
The results of the tests were promising and the main hypothesis has been confirmed. 
However, it is easy to notice that ),(),( TtFTtF teor  values do not change 
proportionally to ),( TtFS teorT   values. The relationship between the two is clearly 
non-linear. Besides, the linear model could generate negative values of the forward 
rates. This observation paves the way for a new version of the model (3) as shown in 
(6).  
(6) 
q
teorteorteorfund TtFTtFTtFTtFaTtFTtF ),(),()),(),(sgn(),(),(   
 
3.3 Calibration of the Model 
 
Parameters a, q were calibrated by maximizing the correlation between  
),(),( TtFTtF teor  and TSTtF ),( . Simultaneously, the T
fund STtF ),(  difference is 
minimized.  The parameters take the following values: 11,0a , 200q . Figure 1 
illustrates the quality of the “prediction” shown as the difference in errors: TSTtF ),(  
and T
fund STtF ),( . Please note that it is not yet a realistic estimate of futures spot 
rates. The parameters were estimated ex post on historical data. The only purpose this 
procedure served is to initially calibrate the model. 
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Figure 1: Prediction errors generated by FFR model (initially calibrated) and 
futures rate  
 
Another figure (Figure 2), in which ),( TtFS teorT  , ),(),( TtFTtF
teor  and 
),(),( TtFTtF teorfund   series are compared, also speaks volumes about the quality of 
the model. Please note that the correlation between ),( TtFS teorT   and 
),(),( TtFTtF teorfund   is now 65%, compared with the previous 30% correlation 
between ),( TtFS teorT   and ),(),( TtFTtF
teor . 
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Figure 2: Quality of the model – comparison of ),( TtFS teorT  , 
),(),( TtFTtF teor  and ),(),( TtFTtF teorfund   series. 
 
4 Predictive Power of the Model – Statistical Tests 
 
The model can be used to predict the values of fundamental forward rates and indirectly 
the future spot rates as well. Yet, it has to be emphasized that the calculations are based 
on information available at time t. It is natural that new information arriving in the 
period (T-t) may gradually change the prediction. 
 
The model was calibrated on three-year data sequences, starting July 1999. The 
parameters determined after each calibration complement the model which is then ready 
to generate one forecast. Then the model was calibrated again on another set of data. It 
is a typical one step prediction (with a one month horizon). For example, prediction for 
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25 January 2002 spot rate is given by (6). The parameters have been calibrated on 
historical data. 66,3)5456,361,3(12,05456,3),( )200/1( TtF fund  The value of 
the theoretical forward rate (on 31 December 2001) is 3.5456 since 1M Wibor and Euro 
Libor were 0.1208 and 0.0333 respectively and the spot rate on this day was 3.52. The 
actual spot rate (on 25 January 2002) was 3.64 (compare it to the prediction of 3.66).  
 
 As seen in Figure 3, the values generated by the model ( fundF ) are good predictions of 
future spot rates. 
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Figure 3:  Prediction of the future spot PLN/EUR rate generated by FFR model  
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The predictive power and quality of the model were verified via a series of statistical 
tests. Predictions generated by the model were compared with relevant spot rates 
)),(( T
fund STtF  . Two benchmarks were used for comparison: futures rates 
)),(( TSTtF   and the prediction generated by neural network (NeuroSolutions 
software by Neuro Dimensions was used for the tests). The prediction was generated by 
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) model.) )),(( T
nn STtF  . 
 
First, mean absolute errors were compared. The measure is defined as (Makradakis 
1998): 
 
n
STtF
MAE
iT
fund
i
n
i
|),(| ,
1



  
MAE consistently appeared to be the lowest for predictions generated by the model 
when compared to the benchmarks. Non-parametric Wilcoxon test was used to 
determine whether the differences in forecasting errors were significant.  For example, 
the two series ( T
fund STtF ),(  and TSTtF ),( ) were compared, and the following 
hypothesis was verified:  
0H : )),(()),(( T
fund
T STtFSTtF   
1H : )),(()),(( T
fund
T STtFSTtF  . 
According to the Wilcoxon test, the zero hypothesis was rejected at a 99% confidence 
level. 
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Additionally, the %25,2  band allowed by ERM II is another benchmark – 71% of the 
values generated by the model fell into this band. In general, the values generated by the 
model were significantly better than all the other benchmark values. 
                 
The tests above refer to the model (6). The authors arrived at the version of the model 
assuming that there are two relevant groups of investors. Gradually, the assumption 
concerning only two groups of traders was relaxed. Uninformed traders were also 
incorporated into the model. Their activity is often considered “noise”, and their trades 
cancelled each other out. Still, their presence increases the risk and volatility of 
exchange rates.  
Finally, the Fundamental Forward Rate model has two components. The predicted 
values of the exchange rate lie between the ),( TtF fund  and ),( TtF
fund
  (see the two 
equations below).  
)1(),(),()),(),(sgn(),(),( 
q
teorteorteorfund TtFTtFTtFTtFaTtFTtF , 
)1(),(),()),(),(sgn(),(),( 
q
teorteorteorfund TtFTtFTtFTtFaTtFTtF , 
 
where   represents the number of uninformed traders. The prediction generated by the 
model is rarely one number, more often it is a range of values lying within a certain 
band. The width of the band depends on the informed traders’ activity. A major 
difficulty, however, lies in how to recognize informed traders. The information can be 
derived from either publicly available Commitment of Traders Reports or an analysis of 
the bid-ask spread (the model by Glosten and Milgrom that shows the relationship 
between bid-ask spread and the activity of the uninformed traders could be used). 
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5 Conclusions 
 
The Fundamental Forward Rate model that has been presented in this paper is based on 
an analysis of the futures market. However, as it has been proven many times, the  
futures exchange rate itself is not a good predictor of future spot rates. A micro-
structural analysis of the market leads to the conclusion that participants of the market 
are heterogeneous; there are two predominant forces and two groups of informed traders 
that create the greatest impact on the prices of futures contracts: arbitrageurs and 
fundamental traders. The former act automatically driven by interest rate parity, but the 
activity of the latter group can be an indication of how future spot rates will change. By 
measuring how far the futures rate diverges from its theoretical value, the tension 
between the two forces can be shown. The model, based on the assumptions provided 
and empirical research, enables the prediction of future spot rates more precisely than 
the benchmarks that have been used for comparison so far. 
 
This paper, however, should be considered only a small step in a promising line of 
research. First, it is an adaptive model which relies on historical data. In order to obtain 
more realistic rates some other method of calibrating data must be found. Besides, a lot 
of the information indispensable to feed the model (data on categories of traders) is still 
publicly unavailable.  And yet, the model provides a valuable insight into how 
expectations with regard to future spot rates are formed in the futures market. 
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The research may also be of some use to countries (e.g. CEEC-10) that face joining the 
Euro zone and setting a central rate against the Euro.  
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